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Taxing Banking Firms: A Conceptual Framework1
Public finance theory has relegated the analysis of taxation of firms’ activity almost
exclusively to non-financial firms. The explanation is, to some extent, obvious: economic
disciplines have often regarded taxation and its effects mainly in connection with the
forces driving or hindering growth potential and wealth. The central role of industry in
the development of modern economies somehow imprinted the direction of scholars’
research. Although financial intermediation has been recognised as fundamental in
supporting the performance of economic activity, its role has always been more complex
to include in the picture. Some perception of potential differences in the impact of taxation
on financial firms’ activity can be traced in the literature, but a systematic stream of
analysis has not arisen yet.
 The objective of this paper is to present a description of the state of the art in the
analysis of the effects of taxation on financial firms (FFs) activity, with particular emphasis
on banking. More specifically, the aim is to assess whether taxation of financial
intermediaries may result in effects on their decisions that significantly differ from those
expected in the “standard case” of non-financial firms (NFFs). After considering the
differences already envisaged by the economic theory and by the institutional
arrangements, the analysis focuses on those peculiar features of FFs that make their
business structurally different from the others and that may possibly imply a formally
identical tax regime to produce a distinct incidence process when applied to FFs.
The paper is organised as follows: paragraph 1 reviews the literature on banking and
the literature on taxation to find possible integrations; paragraph 2 highlights the
peculiarity of FFs, and of banks in particular; in paragraph 3 we assess these peculiarities
to identify the aspects that are relevant to the way taxation affects banks’ decisions;
paragraph 4 considers the issue of cost of capital in the context of banking activity;
paragraph 5 reconsiders the traditional effective tax rates approach in order to better
adopt it to the special case of banks; finally, paragraph 6 gives preliminary conclusions,
mainly suggesting strategies for integrating the different approaches from banking
literature and taxation literature, analysed in the paper.
1.Banking vs. Taxation Literature
Literature on banking regards financial intermediation as a peculiar production
process under several respects. The relevance of this issue is due to the important role that
banking firms play, acting as financial intermediaries among the other economic agents,
ensuring the link between saving and investment in the economies, and directing capital
towards the most efficient uses. By providing, not only households, but also the other
1 Le opinioni presentate sono personali e non coinvolgono la responsabilità della Banca d'Italia e dell'Eurosistema.
L'articolo è stato redatto nell'ambito di un progetto di ricerca condotto nel corso del 2005-06.
firms with financial services that are instrumental to their business, banks can affect their
decisions.
The debate about the role of banking firms has taken place for a long time.2 It has
been very rich and has pointed to the uniqueness of banks’ activity, stressing different
aspects and reasons.3 In the last decades, the development of new markets and new
intermediaries, with their implications for the supervisory regulation, drew the
economists’ attention to issues like financial systems and financial stability, raising again
the question of the role of banking. Meanwhile, banking theory took advantage from the
simultaneous progress in information, game, and finance theories. This process resulted in
a body of literature on banking that, focussing on the microeconomic aspects, explored the
implications of banking firms’ behaviour for macro aspects like financial market structure,
instability risk of banking systems, banking regulation, monetary policy transmission
channels. In doing so it allowed to overcome the unsatisfactory features of the previous
approach that had been looking at these aspects separately, by simply assuming the
existence of the banking firms without explicit justification.4 The microeconomics of the
banking firms highlights the peculiarities of their production technology and of the
context in which they perform their activity. The recognition of such peculiarities is
testified also by the analysis of the institutional arrangement of banking systems in all
developed countries, since they all prescribe specific regulatory constraints on banking
firms. Banking literature looks at these constraints as an extra-burden on financial
intermediaries, defining it as “quasi taxation”.
The recognition of the peculiarity of banking activity does not seem to be equally
acquired by taxation literature.5
Generally speaking the characteristics of any production process (with its
peculiarities), inevitably shape the structure of firms’ balance sheets and have implications
for their ability to adjust to, and possibly shift, the burden imposed by taxation. Although
this phenomenon is always present when comparing the reaction to taxation by firms
operating in different economic sectors, it certainly plays a major role in the case of
banking firms. For instance, the high degree of substitutability among the financial
instruments implies bigger and more immediate opportunities for tax shifting, both from
the supply side, by the savers, and from the demand side, by investors. The final economic
effect of the same change in the tax rate applying to both financial and non-financial firms
could than be more widespread and rapid in the first case.
2 For one of the first attempts to elaborate a general theory of the bank see, for example, De Viti de Marco
(1898, 1934).
3 The specific role of banking firms has been attributed by the economic literature to the monetary and
credit functions they perform, by providing the economy with liquidity, supplying credit, and integrating
these two functions through maturity and liquidity transformation (alternatively stressing any of these
aspects). An extensive analysis of this literature is not the object of this paper, so we refer directly, for
example, to the very useful reviews in Santomero (1984, 1992) and Bossone (2000). Seminal papers on this
subject are Fama (1985), Goodhart (1986, 1987), Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Diamond (1984), Gale and
Hellwig (1985).
4 See, for example, Marotta and Pittaluga (1993).
5 The issue has received more attention only recently. In 2003 the World Bank completed a research
project on “Taxation of financial intermediation” (edited by Honohan), which is probably the most complete
contribution on the subject. With respect to our analysis, the focus is more on financial intermediation than
on financial intermediaries. See also Huizinga (2004).
Under a theoretical viewpoint, the attention of scholars in taxation field has been
captured by issues related to taxation of financial instruments rather than of FFs’ activity
itself (more to indirect than to direct taxation).
Within the framework of indirect taxation, literature has focused on the conceptual
aspects involved in the optimality of exempting financial instruments, given that financial
services may be considered intermediate inputs for NNFs. Policy prescriptions from the
different models, indeed, usually depend on the assumed role of money i.e. whether it is
regarded as consumption or intermediate good. Theory did not reach definite conclusions
about the opportunity to treat FFs and NFFs homogenously, by taxing products and
services of both. Under the institutional viewpoint, however, most of the OECD countries
made the choice of exempting financial services from VAT. This decision depends mainly
on the difficulties arising from the VAT tax base definition in case of the traditional
banking intermediation services (deposit collection and lending). Exemption of financial
services from VAT implies that banking firms, contrary to those in other sectors, end up by
representing the final consumer for the (intermediate) goods they acquire. Therefore, they
pay for the corresponding VAT and are subject to VAT on investment input.
Regarding direct taxation, with only little exception,6 no specific concern arises from
taxing financial firms per se. The main issue traceable in taxation literature relates to the
optimality of zero-taxation of capital income in all its forms, in order to avoid double
taxation of consumption.7 However, this is obviously a much more general issue involving
taxation of firms without distinctions among financial or non-financial sectors. Several
arguments may be opposed to the view supporting zero-taxation of capital, specifically as
far as corporate tax is concerned: corporate tax has to respond, not only to efficiency
criteria, but also to equity ones (by taxing corporations shareholders do not delay
taxations on their income; corporations are recognised an ability to pay separate from the
shareholders’; corporations benefit from public expenditure on infrastructures so they
have to contribute by some benefit principle; etc.) or to revenue goals;8 and these other
goals are apparently relevant enough to prevail in the institutional arrangement of actual
tax systems.
There seems to be broad consensus among taxation scholars and practitioners about
applying corporate taxes based on the same principles, both to FFs and NFFs9. Although
special rules are typically devised by the tax systems to take care of specific aspects of FFs’
activity, they are perceived simply as minor adjustments that are necessary to ensure
neutrality.10 These “corrections” to the general criteria usually concern the tax treatment of
6 For example, Caminal (2004).
7 See, on the topic, Boadway and Keen  (2003) and Caminal (2003).
8 Corporate tax is often justified on the grounds that it allows to tax profit rents; it turns out that in actual
tax systems it usually taxes also the component of profit remunerating own capital.
9 As far as we could conclude from a review of taxation literature, there are very few contributions
explicitly recognising the need to consider banks peculiarities. Most of them simply focus on the special
treatment provided by the existing tax systems, giving ex-post explanations for the rational behind these
normative choices. “In principle, the income of financial institutions should be measured the same way as the income
of other business. Although financial institutions are subject to the usual corporate income tax, their income often
receives special treatment in several respects.” (Stotsky, 1995).
10 It is revealing, for instance, that Honohan (1999) addresses these features (and the “quasi taxation”
associated with financial regulation) as forms of corrective taxation aimed at amending pre-existing
distortions: “An important practical issue for corrective taxation is the treatment of loan loss reserves. Many tax
authorities have tended to err on the side of refusing to accept loan loss reserves as deductions from a bank’s taxable
loan loss reserves and credit loss devaluation. However, actual tax systems have been
sometimes in a position of confronting problems arising exactly from the differentiated
impact expected on FFs by specific forms of business taxation. They usually resorted to
either tax rates diversification or specific prescriptions in the tax bases rules. One
enlightening example is the IRAP case in Italy.11
To understand how the peculiarity of financial firms may affect the mechanisms by which
taxation works out its effects, it is necessary to re-examine the meaning of the main variables
underlying the decisions of production, investment and finance. In other terms, the
relevant question is how output, input, accumulation, value added, financing sources, and
so on, can be defined for a FFs and in what these concepts differ from the same economic
concepts as applied to the non-financial sector.12 Such a conceptual framework allows to
“map out” where and how taxation and quasi-taxation enter in the FFs’ decisions and to
focus on the differences with respect to the NFFs.
Form such an exercise, a revision of the economic meaning of the tax indicators most
commonly used in tax policy analysis presumably derives as well. Indeed, it is
questionable whether the ordinary tools to assess the distortionary effects of taxation on
firms decisions, developed from NFF models, may be appropriate when applied to FFs
and in particular to banks. This problem is obviously more severe in case of indicators
explicitly based on some underlying model of the firm’s behaviour (like the so-called
marginal or average “effective tax rates”).
In some cases the issues turn out to be more of an empirical nature, simply relating to
the quantitative relevance of a channel of transmission of the tax effect; in others, for
example the impact of taxation on the financing decisions, the issues have deeper
theoretical implications.
2.What is different in banks’ decisions?
Firm’s decisions concern real aspects, like production and investment, and financial
aspects, like investment financing.
The current state of the art fundamentally draws from the contribution of finance
theory by Modigliani and Miller (M&M) and its aftermath.13 M&M theorem states that
corporate investment and finance choices are independent. The firm’s final objective is the
maximisation of the market value of the corporate equity, representing the shareholders
wealth. In a frictionless world – i.e. with complete market, perfect information, and no
taxes – the value of a firm is independent of its financial structure, due to arbitrage:14 an
increase in financial leverage would increase financial risk and the cost of risk capital
accordingly, restoring the equilibrium. In such a context, the cost of capital is given by the
income, fearing that they will be used to excess as an unverifiable way of deferring tax. Experience, however, suggests
that banks are naturally too slow to recognise the risk of loan losses and to provision for them. A liberal tax policy in
this regard would be corrective by restoring the tax incentive to make adequate advance provision for losses (Escolano
1997).”  (p. 4; our underlining).
11 This issue is analysed in details in Farabullini, Maurizi, Monacelli and Pazienza (2005).
12 See on this matter the paper by Gobbi  and Zotteri (2005), which is part of this research.
13 Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963), Miller (1977), DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), just to remember some.
14 This is known as M&M Proposition I
capitalisation rate of a pure equity stream from the same class of investment. From the
development of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) in finance literature, a better
treatment of the role of risk in investment decisions descended, which could be easily
incorporated in the cost of capital from M&M framework, by adjusting the relevant
capitalisation rate for risk.15 The basic M&M model was progressively enriched in several
directions, to ensure more realistic features. The first step was the introduction of
corporate and personal taxes and bankruptcy costs, which allowed the determination of an
optimal financial structure for the firm, by generating revenue and cost associated to debt
finance. Other developments focused on the removal of some of the restrictive hypotheses
of the original M&M version.
Public finance literature instilled into this approach by elaborating on the cost of
capital concept to disentangle the tax component. From such process, a well-established
branch of tax literature originated, from Jorgenson’s contribution on user cost of capital
(1963) to King and Fullerton’ development of the marginal effective tax rates (1984).16 This
conceptual framework proved extremely powerful for taxation analysis: it was flexible
enough to allow a very detailed modelling of all the most relevant features of the actual
tax systems and offered significant advantages in terms of international or inter-temporal
comparisons.
The use of such tools, however, may prove troublesome when applied to banks.
Once their activity is examined more in detail, indeed, it is clear that the underlying
theoretical models are hardly capable of satisfactorily describing how banking firms
operate. The efficient market hypothesis, retained in the subsequent derivations of the
original M&M model, is particularly troublesome. Strictly speaking, the role of banks as
intermediary institutions would be redundant in a world where, like in the original M&M
model, all the economic agents have access to the same information at the same time:
under these hypotheses, finance should not matter because the private agents who are in
surplus could directly finance those who are in deficit without any intermediation.
The features of banking activity which seem in contrast with the model underlying
M&M theory are well captured by another stream of literature, which was developing
meanwhile within the industrial organisation discipline (IO).17 According to this approach,
the existence itself of financial intermediaries is justified by market imperfections.
In the following paragraphs we discuss what, in our opinion, should be regarded as
the more relevant aspects emerging from IO literature on banking that should dissuade
from using M&M-derived models in case of banking firms. They can be summarised as
follows:
1. the peculiarities of the production process (the particular nature of output; the different
relevance of inputs, the intrinsic role of financial risk, the stricter intervolving  among
asset/liability composition and production);
2. the anomalous role of debt and the peculiarity of financing decisions;
15 Hamada (1969), Rubinstein (1973).
16 The discussion of these indicators is presented in chapter 5.
17 See Freixas and Rochet (1997). Financial markets are affected by informational asymmetries, so that
economic agents have to bear costs (transaction, monitoring, etc.) that specialised agents, like banks, may
more efficiently face due to informational advantages by intermediating investors and savers. Banks sell
these services; to do so they simultaneously buy and sell financial instruments (i.e. sell financial contracts).
3. the presence of banking supervision.
2.1  Production process
Most of the peculiarity in banking production process depends on the nature of its
ouput. According to modern banking theory, banks are firms that supply financial services
(“production approach”). This approach differs from a somewhat more traditional one
that stresses the “intermediation process”18 among deposits and loans. A relevant
consequence is that deposits are seen as output, contrary to the intermediation approach
that treats them as inputs for the provision of loans.19  For our purposes we find it useful
to follow the production approach.
The supply of financial services is embedded in specific financial instruments: loans and
deposits, but also other financial products (the supply of which has progressively
increased, as the composition of interest margins vs. fees and charges testifies). Production
of the inbuilt-financial-services is usually assumed equivalent to the production of the
financial instruments themselves. We claim that, although the distinction made here may
seem captious and redundant, it actually helps in better identifying the process generating
revenue and cost items.
Bank’s production is multi-product and is characterised by a high degree of
jointness.20 A good example of these characteristics is given by the intermediation between
deposits and loans.
The fact that the financial services provision is embedded into financial instruments
generates a much stricter link between production decisions and balance sheet items.
Indeed, most of output provision directly reflects into changes in the stock variables of the
bank’s balance sheet.21  For instance, loan supply increases the assets, while deposit supply
increases the liabilities. This feature is not straightforward to rationalise in the economic
terms traditionally used when considering NFFs. For instance, the acquisition by the bank
of bonds for its own account, that increases assets, can be regarded as output, while in the
usual NNFs analytical framework, the increase in the asset would be considered
investment. It is, indeed, by following this very same logic that in 2001 the EU Report on
18 Sealey and Lindley (1977).
19 In banking literature, deposits are sometimes treated as input to loans, sometime considered as output,
sometimes both based on empirical results (Hanckock, 1985). As Fixler (1993) points out: “The principal
concern in identifying inputs and outputs is how to classify demand deposit related financial services. Since demand
deposits are used in the production of loans it is argued that they are input. The problem with such a classification is
that demand deposit services, which are final services, are then not counted as part of the bank’s output but rather as
part of the payment for inputs.” (p. 983).
20 Onado (1996), for instance, in describing the operational aspects that distinguish the production process
of banks from other industries, underlines the “multi-product characteristic of banking activity” by emphasising
that “the peculiarity of the bank is in the fact that the supply of multiple products is characterised by elements of
jointness and productive intertwining much more intense with respect to other firms” (p. 37; our translation). To
sustain his argument he gives the example of the supply of deposits, which simultaneously represent an
input for the supply of loans.
21 This phenomenon characterizes, in particular, the core function of the banks, as money suppliers, who
issue claims on themselves accepted as money by the public, and credit suppliers, who lend claims on their
own debt. As far as the supply of other services leaving the stock variables, and the balance sheet, unaffected
it must be reminded that their share has increased over time with the diversification of banking activity (see
Gobbi and Zotteri, 2005).
Company Taxation introduced the “Financial Assets” item among the alternative
investment destination of firms’ capital. Although such a treatment could be correct in
case of NNFs, it certainly raises problems in case of FFs, and banking firms in particular: it
is questionable, at least in our opinion, whether it is legitimate to consider this action as
investment rather than as pure production, giving rise to revenue rather than to costs.
In other words, production of a bank may be seen as asset/liability management, so
that the composition of the bank’s balance sheet reflect output decisions rather than
financing decisions as it would be for a NFF: any increase in the leverage, would reflect a
decision to supply deposit rather than a decision to resort to debt in order to finance an
investment. If it is so, an increase in liabilities in case of a banking firm is associated to higher
production that generates revenue, not to higher investment financing that generates costs. This
issue has obviously relevant implication for the cost of capital definition. It gives rise to a
major difference between FFs and NFFs, which make it very hard to apply a common
economic framework in the analysis of the firms’ decisions.
As for the input side, we assume a production process where banks use the same
inputs as other firms (capital, labour, intermediate goods or services). Factor intensity is
the typical one characterising the FFs: among capital inputs, physical capital plays a
marginal role; on the other hand, investment in buildings and accumulation of intangible
capital (development of software, etc.) may be extremely relevant; production is very
labour intensive. A specific aspect to consider is a higher share of labour costs devoted to
training, which seems to signal more significant investment in human capital. In terms of
the effects induced by the tax treatment of corporate income, the implications of this factor
intensity are high labour taxation and property taxes, and lower deductions from physical
capital.22 Summarising, from the input side the difference between banks and other firms,
particularly NFFs, is mainly a relative intensity issue related to factor composition.
Sketching the production process in a very simplified way,23 we may assume that a
bank produces a bunch of financial services Y, embedded in some mix of financial
products like loans Ln, deposits D and other products OP, linked by a relationship g
[1] Y ≡ g (Ln, D, OP)
by using a production technology f with physical capital K, labour force L, and
intermediate goods X as inputs
[2] Y = f (K, L, X)
subject to a very simplified asset/liability constraint equalising, as the most important
items, deposits D and equity E, on the liability side, to loans Ln and securities B, on the
asset side:24
[3] D+E = Ln+B
When output changes - due to the supply of new loans or deposits that directly affect
the outstanding stocks of Ln or D, or due to the provision of the other products OP that
affect for instance B or E stocks on bank’s behalf - the composition of the balance sheet is
modified consistently. Even in a static context, this link would impose a consistency
22 Consequently, the weight of the tax incentives to physical capital accumulation tends to be lower as well.
23 For a more formalised analysis see Monacelli and Pazienza (2005).
24 A more realistic constraint would include at least securities issues on the liability side and equity
acquired on the asset side.
relationship, which is actually complicated by the regulatory constraints on capital ratios.
To say it differently, the output choice for banking firms, as mentioned before, looks more like a
choice of the asset/liability composition.
Finally, an element of differentiation of the production process with respect to NNFs
stems from the role played by risk. Risk characterises any production activity, but in case
of FFs it has stronger implications. Indeed, financial instruments, that are the object of the
production activity, are means to defer purchasing power over time and therefore
represent a way to manage risk. As a result, financial intermediation involves risk
management by definition. The relevant implication for our analysis is that in the
evaluation of profits and of the company value, risk plays a role that should not be
neglected.
2.2 Finance decisions
The complex relationship between output and composition of asset and liability
points to a more substantial criticism against the mere extension to FFs of models
developed within the M&M approach in the theory of finance.
Whether financial liabilities represent a source of finance for capital accumulation or
simply output (or both) is crucial for the identification of an appropriate theoretical
framework for assessing the consistency with the usual tax indicators. Deposits represent
the most relevant share of banks’ liabilities. In a “production model” like ours, they
contribute the supply of financial services exactly as loans do, and therefore they are to be
considered output. Revenue from deposits stems from the banks applying a lower interest
rate to depositors, with respect to the rate they would pay if raising the same liabilities in
the inter-bank market for their own financing purposes. The difference between the two
rates is the price charged by the bank for the service it offers the clients in terms of custody
and immediate disposal of the money cash deposited.
This peculiar aspect of banking activity has implications for the cost of capital
determination. For NFFs, in a M&M framework, any increase in debt would generate
financial distress costs raising the financial risk of the firm, and hence the cost of equity
capital. In case of a bank the links become more complex. An increase in deposits by
raising output may also increase revenue. The cost of capital therefore reflects both the
higher financial risk associated to the higher leverage and the quality of the financial
services supplied by means of the new deposits. Under these circumstances the arbitrage
conditions ensuring separability between the firm’s real and financial choices could not
work.
If for a bank debt generates revenue from the supply of the associated financial
services, and not only costs, it seems reasonable to assume that banks have an intrinsic
incentive to extend their “leverage” beyond what NFFs would do. In particular, due to
their ability to earn revenues on debt issuance, banks may not necessarily face rising net
costs from increasing debt, so that in principle they may find convenient to increase debt
finance without limit (or at least within much lower limits than NFFs).25 Moreover,
25 According to Diamond and Rajan (2000) “in  a world of certainty, the bank maximizes the
amount of credit it can offer by financing with a rigid and fragile all-deposit capital structure”.
banking systems benefit from monopoly power in collecting deposit. Such power is
recognised by laws and regulations and it is usually associated with legal restrictions,
synthetically described in the next paragraph.
The peculiar nature of debt and the related regulatory requirements lead to the
conclusion that banks determine their optimal financial structure by a very different
decision process from the one characterising NFFs. Strictly speaking, their financial
structure represents more the counterpart of output decisions rather than of financing
ones. Therefore, risk capital should be regarded as the major marginal source of finance:
banks employ debt as much as they can and use risk capital according to the more binding
between two exogenous constraints: the “regulatory” requirements and “market”
requirements (bankruptcy costs and reputation, bank’s governance and asymmetric
information between bank and investor).26 Their decisions about the optimal financial
structure mainly reflect external constraints, rather than the typical determinants of the
choice carried out by NFFs.
2.3 Banking regulation
Banks and, to a lesser extent, other financial institutions, have been traditionally
subject to regulations that do not apply to NFFs. The rationale of these rules refers to
banks' specificity, as expressed by the collection of liquid liabilities and the
contemporaneous granting of illiquid loans. This peculiarity of the balance sheet is
associated to legal restrictions, because only banks can issue liabilities that are repayable
on demand. This feature has been considered at the origin of banking runs and crises that
historically contributed to the creation of Central Banks, like the Federal reserve in 1914, or
to the introduction of supervisory regulations, such as the banking laws approved in
many European countries in the Thirties. Still today the different forms of banking
regulations are justified by the need to ensure the nominal value of banks' deposits, the
correct functioning of the payment system, the normal financing conditions of the
economy.27
Even if more extreme positions in favor of free banking must be taken in account,28 it
is generally agreed that a sound and safe banking system is the result of the mutual
combination of capital requirements and other supervisory actions, on one side, and
market discipline, on the other side. Countries differ in the weights they assign to
supervision and market discipline to ensure banking stability. This paragraph describes
26 See, on  this topic, Berger, Herring and Szego (1995).
27 See, for instance, Goodhart (1985) as a seminal reference. We may refer to different strands of the
literature such as: the classical bank run models (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983); the interaction between
banking crises and currency crises, whose analysis has been reinforced by the economic difficulties of the
Asian economies in the second half of the Nineties; the new analysis of the old subject of bank contagion (see
De Bandt and Hartmann, 2000, for a survey).
28 Many critiques have been raised towards bank regulation. The theory of public choice underlined that
civil servants and legislators are not only motivated by the pursuing of the public interest but also by their
private goals. Stigler was the first to claim that government agencies may act not in the interests of society
but may be captured by the interests of the subject who are regulated. Historical reexamination of free
banking periods shows that the quantitative importance of banking crises may have been exaggerated
(Kaufman, 1996). These views are summarized by the idea that "leaving monetary and banking arrangements to
the market would have produced a more satisfactory outcome than was actually achieved through governmental
involvement" (Friedman and Schwartz, 1986).
the main forms of supervision in Europe and other countries. Bank regulation and
supervision have been seen as having quasi-fiscal implications,29 as they may introduce
distortions in banking business. Similarly to the approach of the financial repression
literature - which emphasized that credit ceilings, controls of interest rates, high reserve
requirement ratios and other regulatory measures have been often responsible for low
levels of financial intermediation - we will not deal here with credit ceilings and controls
of interest rates, because these measures have been abolished in rich countries and
attenuated in poorer ones.30
The reserve requirement was certainly in the past a form of quasi-taxation. Banks
were required to put a high percentage of their deposits, in terms of stocks or flows, in
central banks’ accounts, which were remunerated at lower rates than market ones.
Originally introduced as a prudential supervision instrument, the reserve requirement
evolved as a tool to control the multiplicative mechanism of deposits and loans. At the
same time the reserve ratios decreased in many countries while the remuneration of the
banks’ funds in the accounts with the Central banks increased.
In the euro area the reserve ratio is now 2 per cent of the outstanding stock and the
reserve is remunerated at a market rate. In the Eurosystem the functions of the minimum
reserve system are the stabilization of money market interest rates and the enlargement of
the structural liquidity shortage of the banking system. Reserve ratios also decreased
outside the euro area countries and are now less onerous than in the past. However, there
is still concern for high reserve ratios in some countries, mainly the less developed ones.31
Capital ratios are probably the most frequent measure of prudential supervision in
the world. This was mainly due to the Basle agreement of 1988 that introduced the idea that
international banks had to maintain a ratio equal to 8 per cent of capital to risk-adjusted
assets. Capital is split into two types: Tier1 and Tier2. Tier1 includes capital, reserves,
funds for general banking risks, and innovative instruments such as preferred shares.
Tier2 includes revaluation reserves, hybrid instruments, subordinated debt, general
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where Ai represents the asset i and RWi the associated risk weight according to the
banking regulation.
The capital ratio was introduced to ensure a "level playing field" for large
international credit institutions active in the same markets. Subsequently, the agreement
was introduced in many countries and often extended to all the national credit
institutions. The capital ratio is often conceived as a buffer stock that banks must maintain
to cover credit losses, even if it is arguable that a capital ratio of 8 per cent would be
sufficient if a hard bank crisis takes place. We prefer to stress the other justification of the
29 See, for instance, Huizinga (2004).
30 For administrative measures in UK and Italy see Goodhart (1991) and Passacantando (1996). See Yelek
(1996) on financial repression in Mediterranean countries.
31 See, for example, Caminal (2004).
capital ratio, i.e. the idea that it is an incentive compatible rule to reduce moral hazard of
banks' shareholders.32 Shareholders may limit their risk propensity if they are forced to
provide a minimum amount of capital. Many countries in the world introduced the
requirements of Basel 1 and plan to implement the new accord of Basel 2, which was
endorsed in June 2004.
Banks often have a capital ratio higher than 8 per cent. This evidence probably
derives from the reputation effect of higher capital adequacy and by the idea of
supervisors that 8 per cent is only the minimum level of capital.
Here we remember the four key principles for the supervisory review process of the
second pillar of the Basel 2 agreement:
a) Banks should have a process for assessing their overall capital adequacy in relation to
their risk profile and a strategy for maintaining their capital levels;
b) Supervisors should review and evaluate banks’ internal capital adequacy assessment
and strategies, as well as their ability to monitor and ensure their compliance with
regulatory capital ratios;
c) Supervisors should expect banks to operate above the minimum regulatory capital
ratios and should have the ability to require banks to hold capital in excess of the
minimum;
d) Supervisors should seek to intervene at an early stage to prevent capital from falling
below the minimum levels required to support the risk characteristics of a particular
bank, and they should require remedial action if capital in not maintained or restored.
Finally, even if they often influence the composition of banks’ assets and liabilities,
we will not deal with the forms of banks supervision used differently all over world. We
may refer to measures as barriers to entry, competition regulatory variables, restrictions on
banking business, separation between banking and commerce, deposit insurance, official
supervisory action variables.33
3.What implication for the appraisal of taxation
influence?
The analysis carried out in the previous chapter confirms that the question addressed
in this paper is of some relevance. Banks’ business is peculiar and differs from NFFs’
activity under many respects. The next step is to investigate whether and how the specific
aspects that distinguish banking from other firms’ business may, indeed, bear
consequences in terms of the ways taxation influence firms’ decisions. A re-interpretation
of the instruments generally used in taxation literature to assess the impact of taxes seems
useful.
Among the issues traditionally considered by literature on the effects of taxation34 the
most relevant are represented by the influence of taxes on decisions about: (1) labour
employment; (2) capital investment; finance; (3) profit distribution; (4) international
allocation of capital (and the tax competition implications); (5) corporate governance.
32 See Santos (2001) for a review of the literature.
33 See Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001) for a survey.
34 See Mintz (1995), for example.
All of these issues may be touched by the peculiarities of the financial intermediation
process. The analysis carried out so far, for example, showed that banking activity differs
from other firms’ one for at least the first three issues in the above list.
As far as labour employment decisions are concerned, the higher labour intensity in FFs
leads to a more significant weight of taxes on labour. These are usually levied both at the
employer’s and at the employee’s level and may take different forms according to the tax
systems of the specific countries. Payroll taxes, social security contributions, personal
income taxes may have different forward and backward shifting possibilities. During the
last decades European countries have experienced a relative high weight of labour income
taxation with respect to capital income taxation. This is due to the increasing economic
integration, enhancing the role of taxation especially for the more mobile production
factors like capital. The combination of fiscal rules to ensure sustainability of public
finances, from one side, and greater impact of tax differentials, from the other, led in most
countries to a progressive decrease of taxation which regarded capital in the first place,
labour income being less subject to tax competition. Less capital intensive and more labour
intensive firms, like FFs, may have been penalised by this process. A second aspect to
consider, which could play in the opposite direction, is the higher role of human capital
within FFs production process. Actual tax systems impose virtually no depreciation of this
capital component, so that they implicitly allow for immediate deduction of the related
costs.35 Sometimes anti-avoidance constraints to these deductions are prescribed by tax
laws, reducing the potential advantage. A similar conclusion may apply to the larger use
of intermediate goods.
Investment decisions are also an important source of difference between banks and
NFFs. For banking firms the role of direct taxation on physical capital investment
(depreciation allowances, tax incentives, and corporate tax rates) may be less relevant.
This is the case for machinery and inventories, due to the limited use of these factors in
financial intermediation. It is less so, for the investment in buildings and intangibles
inputs. As a result, differences in the treatment provided by tax rules among capital inputs
may contribute generating a very different tax burdens with respect to the NFFs. One
important element of diversification when considering the overall tax burden from capital
acquisitions is the need to include for banking firms also the VAT implicitly levied on
investment due to the financial services exemption (since banks purchases represent the
final stage of the VAT chain). The same issue concerns intermediate goods.
The issues addressed above point to differences in the tax burden that reflect
differences in the relative weight of otherwise common determinants of tax levies, in
particular in the production factors intensity. This more easily allows to conciliate the
assessment of the tax effects for a banking firm with the use of a framework still impinging
on the traditional approach in taxation literature. In paragraph 5 we make an attempt in
this direction.
On the other hand, the mechanisms through which taxation affect financial decisions
of a banking firm may be more difficult to reconcile with the traditional approaches used
by taxation theory. Such an attempt collides with the deep differences in the determination
35 The drawback of this treatment is that non-depreciable input cannot benefit from possible tax
advantages from investment incentives. These issues are more extensively illustrated in Monacelli and
Pazienza (2005).
of an “optimal financial structure”, due to the peculiar nature of debt for banks and to the
related regulatory requirements. In our opinion a promising way to approach these issues
is by looking for integration between a more realistic model of the financial choices of the
bank, which is able to capture the output aspect of these choices, and the articulated
models available from traditional taxation literature. The main obstacle is the need to
ensure consistency among the underlying assumptions of the two approaches.
The next paragraph focuses mainly on this last issue by exploring how to define the
cost of capital for a bank and by making a first attempt to include taxation within this
different framework. As we will see, the proposed solution is more satisfactory as far as
the representation of the bank’s decision process is concerned, but it is less so as far as the
detail allowed in modelling taxation, especially compared to the M&M-derived models.
4. Cost of capital
Cost of capital can be defined as the net expected return that capital suppliers require on
the firm’s uncertain future cash flow; contrary to NFFs, for which the cost of capital depends
on the financial structure, for banks the cost of capital mainly refers to equity capital. The
emphasis on equity capital as the true decision variable can be traced in banking literature
mainly in connection with the internal capital allocation decision and with international
comparisons of cost of capital.36
As a very rough simplification, we can classify cost of capital models, in the
framework of finance theory, into two broad categories: the first one focuses on dividends
as a relevant proxy for expected returns; the second one focuses on the excess return with
respect to the average market return37.
a) according to the Dividend Valuation Model the cost of capital is the discount rate c that
makes the share price equal to the stream of discounted future dividends:38
[5] 




Assuming, for the sake of simplicity, that dividends grows at a constant rate g, we can
obtain the classical Gordon growth model for price and the cost of capital as dividend
yield increased by dividend’s rate of growth:
[6] gP
gDc  )1(0
36 Differences in the cost of capital across countries may arise from persistent or temporary causes.
Temporary differences can be linked to disequilibrium in markets and differences in share prices and
fundamental values; long-run differences can be ascribed, among others, to differences in bank regulation
policies, taxes, capitalizations of banks, and macroeconomic policies mix.
37 For a more detailed classification, see Sironi (1996).
38 The main problems with this theory concern the evaluation of the future stream of dividends and the
price of shares for banks not quoted on Stock Exchange. Moreover, financial institutions show a preference
for a constant stream of dividends, irrespective of the value of the firm on the markets. This could lead to an
increase in cost of capital that depends only on speculative movement in stock markets.
Slightly different is the earnings-price ratio. Under the assumption that actual earnings
are good proxies for future return expected by shareholders, and earnings are fully
distributed as dividend, cost of capital is
[7] PDc n / .
b) According to Risk Valuation Models, the risk premium in excess of the risk free rate (Rf)
can be used as a proxy for the rate of return that shareholders expect. Under the
assumption that actual risk premium Rp will not change in the future (historical
approach), cost of capital can be sketched as c=Rf+Rp. In this framework, the Capital
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) considers cost of capital as the sum of the risk free return
and the systemic risk premium (or cost). A well-know characteristic of the CAPM is the
identification of the β coefficient, measuring the volatility of the return of the single
share, relative to the volatility of the market (or asset class).39  In this context, the cost of
capital is c=Rf+β(Rm-Rf) where Rf is the return on a risk free investment and Rm is the
market return.40
In the case of banking firms, the valuation of cost of capital is complicated by banking
regulation that implicitly influences the valuation measures discussed above. An approach
that, within the Dividend Valuation Models, explicitly takes into account capital regulation,
with the different impact implied for the cost of capital by the various compositions of
output, can be traced in Zimmer and McCauley’s model.41
The authors refer the cost of capital of a bank to equity only and define it as “… the
required spread or fee that a financial product must generate in order to increase the value of the
bank. Because banks are compelled by Basle Accord rules to hold capital against assets, bank cost of
capital is largely determined by the requirement profit rate on the market value of the firm’s equity,
and, to a lesser extent, by the risk premium paid on its subordinated debt”.42 More in details
referring to the production of a loan, the authors specify that the cost of capital is “the net
(after expenses) spread required to generate the required equity return”43 and therefore
constitutes only a share of the total spread. Following the dividend valuation class of
models, McC&Z define the equity return as net profit divided by market value of equity.44
Besides stressing that high leverage is not a result of an optimal decision but is
broadly affected by regulations, McCauley and Zimmer (McC&Z) ascribe the marginal
role of debt in evaluating cost of capital also to the competition that flattens inter-bank and
39 More in details β is the ratio of the covariance between share i’s return and the market return to the
variance of the market return.
40 It is worthwhile to stress that the CAPM relies on several strong assumption, some of which particularly
troublesome for a bank model: asset markets are perfect, frictionless and the information is costless and
simultaneously available to all agents; there are no imperfections such as taxes and regulations; there exist a
risk free asset that investor can borrow or lend in unlimited amount and at a constant rate. Moreover, the
model considers debt as a pure financial instruments while, as previously discussed, debt is a also
component of the bank’s production function.
41 See McCauley and Zimmer (2989, 1990, 1991). For a discussion of the promising features of this model in
assessing the role of taxation see Di Majo (1999).
42 McCauley and Zimmer (1990) p. 536.
43 McCauley and Zimmer (1990) p. 538.
44 Clearly, profit rate must be depurated by temporary factors (as business cycle) and
must reflect the long-run earnings potentialities of the financial firm.
deposit rates.45 Moreover, in case of the so-called “funded products” (i.e. outputs that
need funds to be produced), interest rates on debt instruments (deposits or bonds) may
affect the interest rates on loans, but according to the authors these changes would be
substantially irrelevant in terms of the interest margins. Since the relevant variable
determining the cost of capital is the spread, the level of interest rates on debt does not
directly influence the required return from a financial project. This is even less so in case of
“unfunded products” (i.e. financial products dissociated from fund raising problem), for
which the cost of debt financing is clearly irrelevant.
The cost of capital in McC&Z framework is therefore different from the concept
usually considered by the in traditional taxation literature.
In the traditional approach the cost of capital is referred to capital input (usually
tangibles) and is given by the so-called ”user cost” (economic depreciation plus financial
cost of purchasing the capital input). By comparing it with the marginal revenue from the
capital input, the decision whether to invest is taken, under the assumption that in
equilibrium firms equalise marginal cost and revenue of the investment.
On the other hand, in McC&Z framework the cost of capital refers to the equity only
and is given by the remuneration that the bank’s shareholders expect for it; it corresponds to
the profitability of the bank’s activity (net of all the production costs and of taxes) and determines
the convenience for the bank’s shareholders to “put their money” into the bank. In other words,
the price of the financial products supplied by the bank, for instance the spread from a
loan, must generate a return wide enough to repay at least the overall costs from inputs
(labour, capital and material costs), plus the risk premium on expected losses (in case of
loans) and taxes.46 If the bank sets the spread or the fees below its cost of capital, it causes
a loss for its shareholders. More precisely, the return has to be wide enough to keep the
value of the bank’s shares at least constant.47 The expected return will be determined by
the market conditions: it will be exogenous to the bank in perfectly competitive markets; it
can reflect the imposition of a mark-up over the cost, depending on the degree of
imperfection of the market.48
To simplify extremely, while the concept of cost of capital in the banking framework
refers to the outstanding equity and is given by the remuneration that shareholders expect
for it, in the traditional framework, able to better describe NFFs activity, it refers to the
cost of acquiring physical capital and for the financial component to the issuing new equity
or resorting to debt finance. Therefore, for the bank the relevant variable must be the net
45 “The cost of capital as defined does not include the cost of debt financing (except in the case of using subordinated
debt for tier 2 capital), despite the fact that banks are highly leveraged. The first reason for this exclusion is that banks
competing in the same market pay much the same interest rates at the margin. In addition, the level of interest rates
does not bear directly on the required return from a financial project.” McCauley and Zimmer (1990), p. 538.
46 According to some empirical literature, shareholders of financial firm compete for net returns.
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) found that “The corporate income tax appears to be passed fully to bank
customers … bank stock investors require net-of-company-tax returns independent of the level of company taxation.” p.
31. For a more recent study, see Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2005).
47 “In order to raise or keep constant the value of the bank, the profit rate on the new equity must be at least as great
as the profit rate on existing equity.” McCauley and Zimmer (1990), p. 538.
48 For instance Moshirian (2001), who adopts this definition of cost of capital to identify FDI determinants
in banking, observes: “Assuming that the spread is set in such a way that it satisfies the required equity cost, one
may use the spread as a proxy for the cost of capital for banks. Thus, the larger the spread required by banks in order to
cover their cost of capital, the less competitive is their position in the international banking market.”
return from the overall production, while for the NFF it is simply the minimum return
savers ask in order to direct their financial resources to the firm’s investment.
The presence of banking regulation complicates matters. Since Basle Accord rules
require banks to hold different quantity (and quality) of capital against assets that are
linked with output choices, the cost of capital of a financial firm depends on the output mix.
Therefore, in computing the cost of capital (and the effective marginal tax rates) we should
not so much distinguish among different types of investment and different types of
financial sources, as it is usually done, but rather among different types of output services.
For each product, the cost of capital is “the spread or fee that allows the required
regulatory capital to earn the rate of return demanded by the market”,49 and therefore able to
maintain at least the same value of shares. More specifically, prudential capital ratios ask
for 8 per cent of Tier1 (core capital) and Tier2 (supplementary capital) capital against risk
activities, prescribing that contribution of Tier1 capital must not be less than half of the
overall ratio. A higher cost is associated to Tier1 capital financing, i.e new share issue, than
to Tier2 capital, i.e. other shares and various forms of subordinated debt, so that this
would be favoured as a financial source. Therefore, if the constraint is binding, at the
margin any increase in output would imply an equal increase in both Tier1 and Tier2
capital. The cost of capital associated to a specific financial product, that reflects in an
increase of asset “i” in the balance sheet  must satisfy:
Ai Ri (1-) = RWiAi  0.04 CT1 + RWiAi 0.04 CT2
where
Ai = asset i
Ri = return (spread or fee) from the asset i (net of production costs)
  = corporation tax rate
RW i = risk weight of asset i (ranging from 0 to 150%)
CT1 = cost of Tier1 (shareholders equity) capital
CT2= cost of Tier2 (other equity and subordinated debt) capital.
Normalising for Ai and reorganising terms:
[8] Ri (1-) = RWi  0.04 (CT1 +CT2)
From which an expression for the cost of capital ccmay be obtained:
[9] cc = Ri = [RWi 0.04 (CT1+CT2)] / (1-)
The approach by McC&Z may provide several specification of the general model [8],
in connection with the “funding requisite” of the instrument that is supplied and, as far as
taxation impact is concerned, the specific marginal source of Tier2 capital.
If a product is “funded” (as a loan) by a simultaneous increase in deposits the return
is given by two components: the return on the asset that is supplied and the return on the
required capital, which depends on the type of capital chosen to satisfy the constraint
imposed by the capital ratios. Different values of the spread necessary to cover the cost of
49 See McC&Z (1991).
capital may be obtained: if for example a new loan is supplied to which a 100 per cent
funding by deposits corresponds, than the overall return will be given by the spread from
the entire loan plus the return from investing the required 8 per cent capital increase on a
risk free asset. If, on the other hand, only the 92 per cent of the loan is funded by deposits
and the residual part is covered by the resources from the required capital increase, the
return will depend on the marginal source of Tier2 capital chosen by the bank. If this is
represented by shares (like preferred shares), than the return will be given by: the spread
between the interest on borrowing and lending, only on 92 per cent of the loan; the
difference between the interest rate on loans and that on a risk free asset, on the remaining
8 per cent. If the 4 per cent of the required Tier2 capital is represented by subordinated
debt, the interest spread component will apply to 96 per cent of the new loan and the
differential with respect of the free asset rate only for 4 per cent of the loan. If, on the other
hand, the product is “not funded”, it will simply give rise to the earning from the applied
fee and from the alternative use of the collected capital. The return (i.e. the cost of capital)
will also depend on the products that are supplied, since they are characterised by different
risk weights for the capital ratios purposes.
These returns will have to be considered net of tax, which may differ according to the
chosen financial instruments. Indeed, the Tier1 capital components do not give rise to tax
deductions,50 while in case of Tier2 capital some components, like subordinated debt, do.
Some expressions for the cost of capital in [8] are summarised in Table 1, where
different hypotheses are assumed, according to the composition of output and the
marginal source of Tier2 capital. Taxation enters these expressions by reducing the return
from the assets and by introducing a tax saving from the deductible costs.
Table 1 – Cost of capital under capital ratio constraints
S=interest spread on “funded” products, net of production costs. - F=fee on “unfunded” products, net of
production costs. – r*=interest rate on a risk-free asset. - CTier1=cost of Tier1 capital. – CTier2=cost of Tier2 capital. –
CPS=cost of Tier2 capital when privileged shares. – CSD=cost of Tier2 capital when subordinated debt. - RWi=risk
weight associated to asset i. - =corporate tax rate.
50 However, part of Tier1 capital is represented by reserves, for which the tax treatment may be different
from the equity component. This issue is not considered here.
This model implies a very simple treatment of taxation and regulatory constraints.
Corporate taxation reduces the return from the assets and hence increases, by this channel,
the cost of capital. This increase is partly compensated by the tax saving from the allowed
deductions in case of a corresponding increase in the Tier2 capital in the form of
subordinated debt. The size of this compensatory effect depends on the risk weight
associated to the acquired asset.
To contrast the increase in the cost of capital determined by the tax the banking firms
may have different opportunity of tax shifting, according to the prevailing market
conditions. Their shifting behaviour therefore could affect consumers’ and NFFs’
decisions. In the McC&Z formulation, however, a full tax shifting behaviour is presumed.
Although this approach has the advantage of highlighting in a very direct way the
link going from corporate taxation to bank’s cost of capital, and hence potentially to the
financial products’ prices, it is not satisfactory enough as far as the modelling of taxation
and tax shifting is concerned. Indeed, the aspects taken into consideration are not the only
ones by which taxes would actually influence the expressions of the cost of capital. Among
the other relevant aspects, for instance, there are depreciation allowances and loan losses
deductions for tax purposes, that would reduce the cost of capital but that, as we stressed
before, may have a very different influence on banking firms with respect to NFFs. To
integrate the analysis of the cost of capital in the direction of better modelling the role of
taxation, some hints may come from literature on the marginal effective tax rates.
5.Tax indicators: Do we need to be compute them
differently for banks?
The tools traditionally proposed by public finance literature to measure the general
impact and the distortionary role of taxation are tax rates of some kind. There is an
extensive literature on the identification of the best tax indicators, the choice of the most
suitable ones obviously depending on the economic questions to which a particular
measure might provide the answer.  Without going into details,51 it’s worthwhile to recall
the main lines of research on the issue of tax measurement.
The three main families of tax rates are represented by statutory tax rates, backward-
looking effective rates and forward-looking effective rates. The first ones are widely used in
comparing corporate taxation systems, but do not give information about the actual tax
burden, which is obviously influenced by the definition of the tax base. The second family
of indicators looks at the ratio between taxes actually paid and a reference economic
aggregate for the tax base (e.g. profits, operating surplus, etc.); it measures the effects of all
the factors determining the tax burden, both the statutory and the exogenous ones (for
instance, the economic cycle). The third one is the most popular. It measures the
theoretical incidence from the application of tax laws (statutory tax rates, depreciation
rates and other ways in which taxable income is defined) to the perspective return of a
specific capital investment project; it is given by the ratio between the tax wedge (i.e.
difference between gross and net-of-tax return) and the gross-of-tax return from the
51 For extensive discussions on this issue see Nicodéme (2001), OECD (2000), Martinez-Mongay (2000) and
Devereux (2004). For an analysis of the problem related to financial firms see also Monacelli (2004).
investment. This approach usually refers to a marginal investment, i.e. not producing
extra-profits, and gives rise to the so-called marginal effective tax rates (METR).52 It
therefore measures the share of gross return necessary to repay taxes, at the margin, if the
firm were to invest in a specific capital input, typically identified by machinery,
inventories, or industrial buildings.
When dealing with banks, all these families of indicators raise problematic issues.53
However, it is clear that the forward looking approach asks for some more structural
modification. Traditional METRs, indeed, focus on the investment decision to buy tangible
assets, and hence do not seem particularly adequate in case of banking firms, where
tangibles represent only a low share of total assets and are of minor importance in the
production function.
Even less satisfactory, from our perspective, is the equivalence between the
investment decision of the FF and the acquisition of financial assets as its counterpart.
Financial assets acquisition, in a framework like ours, is to be considered as output, not as
input accumulation. The cost would be a cost of overall production rather than a cost of
capital. Moreover, the cost of capital expression should be distinguished according to the different
output, in order to take into consideration the effects of capital ratios: the increase in the
risk capital necessary to finance 1 unit of investment varies according to the risk profile of
output that is generated.
Since the role of capital investment, at least in the traditional terms, seems hardly
significant for a financial firm, while it can be considered a labour-intensive firm, it seems
more accurate to consider a method that aggregates taxes, or METRs, on the different
inputs and to switch from an input-investment decision to a production decision
perspective. On this line of research the synthetic measure proposed by McKenzie, Mintz
and Scharf (1997) can be employed to obtain a ”summary statistic” of how taxes impose
upon “the cost of doing business”.54
5.1  A model without taxation
Starting from the basic representation of the production function for a financial firm,
previously introduced by equations [1] and [2], the bank’s costs, from depreciation of
capital, labour and intermediate goods, can be represented as
[9]   XpLwKpC xc  
Drawing from McKenzie, Mintz and Scharf’s methodology and from McKenzie’s
application to banks,55 we focus on the loan production function in a world without taxes.
In this framework,56 the cost function to be minimized can be simplified as:
52 The METR were originally proposed by King and Fullerton (1984). Devereux e Griffith (1998) also
developed this approach with reference to infra-marginal investments, calculating the so-called effective
average marginal tax rates (EAMTR). The “average” derives from the fact that these indicators are obtained
as the average of taxes due on hypothetical investments with different profitability levels.
53 See Monacelli  (2004).
54 McKenzie, Mintz and Scharf  (1997), p. 339.
55 McKenzie (2000) proposes a model of perfect competition that may not be appropriate for the banking
sector but has many suitable characteristics for a tax analysis.
[10] C (Ln; ZL, ZX, ZK)
where Zi are the user cost of inputs.57 The marginal intermediation cost function, MC, can
be derived on the basis of the cost function, presuming a positive relation between
marginal cost and user costs of inputs. As usual, user cost of labour and materials
corresponds to the unit “price” of inputs, while the user cost of capital must include the
opportunity cost of finance , the depreciation rate δ and the inflation rate (here assumed
to be zero), in addition to the price of capital goods pc.
Under the profit maximization framework, in a world without taxes, the optimum
quantity of loans will satisfy the equivalence between marginal revenue (rL-r*) 58 and
marginal cost from intermediating (producing) an extra unit of loan MC.
However, the marginal intermediation cost MC, stemming from the inputs, must be
corrected to take into account that “banks are typically corporations, which are owned by
shareholders who require a minimum (expected) rate of return of their investment in the bank in
order to hold the bank shares” (i.e. the opportunity cost of finance ρ) and for “the fact that a
certain fraction of the loan made by the bank will go bad, due to default” so that “the marginal loan
must also generate a rate of return high enough to cover these loan losses”59 or, in other terms,
the opportunity cost of finance must be adjusted for the default risk ζ. The result of such a
correction is the marginal cost of issuing an extra unit of loan.  The equilibrium condition
is:60
[11] (rL-r*) =MC (Ln; ZL, ZX, ZK) (ρ+ζ) ,
where rL is the interest rate on loans and r* is the return on an alternative risk free asset, or
[12]     MCrrr LnL *
which shows that the net-of-loan-losses rate of return required by the financial market ρ is
equal to the return to the loan divided by the cost of producing it.
56 The model can be rigorously developed starting from expressions [1] [2] [10] by formulating a general
inter-temporal maximization problem, where the financial firm chooses the levels of activity and minimizes
costs in order to obtain the maximum profit. See Appendix 1.
57 In other terms, economies of scope in the loan and deposit production are not considered, i.e. cross
derivatives are zero.
58 The return on a unit of loan is given by the difference between the interest rates applied on the loan rL
and an alternative return r* from a risk-asset (for instance, in the inter-bank market). See Appendix 2.
59 McKenzie (2000) p. 8. Although recognising the central role of equity finance, the author actually does
not exclude deposit as an alternative source and, in the spirit of M&M approach, identifies the opportunity
cost of finance as the usual weighted average between debt and equity expressing  as a function of return
on equity and interest on deposits and of the weights exogenously taken. It is interesting to note how
McKenzie consider his own approach as reversing the “traditional IO approach to modelling banks”, which
“invokes a simple balance sheet relationship that effectively specifies that loans must equal deposits less reserve
requirements” so that “deposits are the only source of funds for the bank” and “the opportunity cost of finance is
simply the interest rate on deposits rD”.
60 The specification of the model presented here is modified with respect to the original McKenzie’s one in
order to treat both loans and deposits as output. In particular, we split up the interest spread into the margin on
loans over the return r* on an alternative risk-free asset, and the margin on deposits given by the difference
between the alternative return and the (lower) interest paid to depositors. In such a way we are able to
maintain a positive marginal revenue to deposits by using an identical specification for both products.
5.2  Introducing taxation
Introducing taxes leads to consider a new formulation of the marginal cost
[13] MC ( Ln; ZL(1+L), ZX(1+X), ZK(1+K) ),
where i are the “traditional” METRs on inputs.61 Expression [13] can be rearranged to
obtain a single measure of the impact of the tax system on marginal cost (the marginal
effective tax rate on intermediation costs ), by aggregating the various expression for
METR.
[14] MC( Ln; ZL(1+mL), ZX(1+mX), ZK(1+mK) ) = (1+L)MC(Ln; ZL, ZX, ZK)





where MCAT and MCBT represent the marginal intermediation costs after and before taxes,
respectively.
The L rate can be obtained as a weighted average of the METRs on input costs,
where factors shares, si, are the weights.62 More in detail, under the assumption of a zero
elasticity of substitution between factors (as in a Leontief’s function), the METR on
intermediation costs L is a simple arithmetic average of METRS of the inputs i:
[16] L = (1+mL) sL + (1+mX) sX + (1+mK) sK -1
Going back to the equilibrium condition [11] we may now introduce taxation on both
sides of the equality. For the revenue side, by subtracting the corporate tax on loan’s
return and adding up the corporation tax saved on the fractions of loans  that are
deductible for risk provision, we get the expression for the net return of issuing an extra unit
of loan:
[17] (rL-r*) (1-c) +c γ ζ
The identity between marginal benefit and marginal cost becomes:
[18] (rL-r*) (1-c) +c γ ζ = (1+L)MC(Ln; ZL, ZX, ZK) (ρ+ζ)
that can be reformulated as:










to obtain the net-of-loan-losses and gross of tax rate of return on a marginal loan rLg.
Finally, under the traditional METR methodology, an overall marginal tax rate on
issuing a loan (an hypothetical tax rate that can transform a gross rate into a net rate of









61 METR on inputs will be discussed in Appendix 2.
62 The specific averaging method depends on the assumption about the form of the production function.
solving rLn (1+*) = rLg . 63
The same methodology can be applied to the issuing of a marginal unit of deposit.
The gross of tax rate of return will be













where MCD obviously refer to the marginal cost of intermediating an additional unit of
deposit and D to the METR on the marginal cost of producing an incremental unit of
deposit.
6. Some preliminary conclusions
From the analysis of banks’ business we identified several peculiarities capable of
affecting the mechanisms by which taxation works out its effects. The first one has to do
with the optimal financial structure; for banking firms this is actually the counterpart of
the production process and has much less to do with the financing of real capital
accumulation, as for NFFs. A second aspect, related to the first one, has to do with the
definition of cost of capital, which is generally referred by banking literature to equity only
and is defined as the net price of financial product able to generate a minimum return to
shareholders, high enough to guarantee that the market value of their shares does not
decrease.
Any attempt to analyse the role of taxation in a banking context has to face these two
peculiarities. Public finance literature offers a well-established conceptual framework that
proved extremely powerful for taxation analysis. However, the underlying theoretical
models are hardly capable of satisfactorily describing how banking firms operate.
We reviewed in paragraph 5 a model for cost of capital determination applied to
banking firms and in paragraph 6 a particular variant of the marginal effective tax rates
model. With respect to the traditional approaches derived from M&M models, mainly
focusing on physical capital, both these models look at the production process rather than
at the investment decision and its financing. By doing so, they offer common grounds for
analysing the effects of taxation on the bank’s decision process more satisfactorily.
The cost of capital model is able to capture the jointness of the production process
(especially the simultaneousness of the loan and deposits supply implied by the
traditional intermediation activity); it also accounts for the anomaly in determination of
the optimal financial structure and explicitly takes into account the regulatory constraints
on the capital ratios. The expression of the cost of capital is not connected with the “use”
of capital, as in standard cost of capital literature referring to NFFs, but it has more the
nature of a mark-up over the overall return from output. The presence of regulatory
constraints, applying in different ways to different products, differentiates the cost of
capital according to kind of marginal output we refer to (similarly to what happens when







rr *  , with * solving the rLn =(1+*) rLg .
computing NFFs cost of capital, for different marginal sources of finance or different kind
of investment).
On the other side, the METR approach, in the version presented here, looks at the
impact of the overall taxation on production, so that it better fits the bank’s framework
and its intertwining between investment and production. Furthermore, it distinguishes
inside the cost of capital the “user” component, stemming from the economic depreciation
and the price embedded in the marginal cost expression, from the capital remuneration.
The latter one, rather than being modelled as the simple cost to repay investors in financial
markets (typically given, in NFFs models, by the interest rates on debt finance or the
opportunity cost for own capital, or an average of the two), is more properly considered as
a mark-up applied to the overall return from the production of a marginal unit of financial
services. In case of loans an extra component for loans losses is also considered.
Both models consider the cost of capital as a more general cost concept than it
usually is for NFFs. It is the return on the bank’s activity wide enough to cover the costs
stemming from the overall inputs (labour, capital and material costs), from the expected
losses in case of loans supply, and from taxes.
The integration between these two approaches is complex but seems promising; it
will continue be the objective of our research. Taxation can be modelled more specifically
by the METR approach exploiting the equivalence between the overall METR and the
average of the METRs on the single inputs. Regulatory restrictions may be modelled by
following the McC&Z approach, diversifying the expressions for the cost of capital and the
effective tax rates, not only among types of investment and sources of finance (as it is
usually done), but also among different output mixes.
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 APPENDIX 1: The model
Starting from a perfect competition model,64 the profit function of the bank can be
sketched as:
[A1] Π = rLLn - r*IB - rDD + OP - C(D, Ln, OP)
where Ln, D, OP are loans, deposits and other financial products, IB is the inter bank
position and rL, rD, r* are loan, deposit and interbank rates.
Considering that IB=D-Ln and OP=f NO, where f are fees and NO number of operations,
the profit function can be rearranged as:
[A2] Π =  (rL-r)Ln + (r*-rD)D + f NO – C (D, Ln, OP),
leading to a maximization problem with usual first order condition, where marginal





















In a multi-period perspective, the bank’s value maximization problem may be expressed
as:
[A4] Max   dtTTIpwLOPDrrLrrte cLcDnL   )*(*)(0

where w is wage, L is the amount of labour, I is investment, pc is the prize of capital
product and TL and TC are respectively, taxes on labour and the corporation tax.
Labour and capital are allocated among different outputs and so:
[A5] L = LLn+LD+LOP
I  = ILn+ID+IOP
Moreover, taxes on labour and capital are given by
[A6] TL= L wL
TC= c [(rL-r*)Ln + γζ Ln+ (r*-rD)D + f NO - w(1+L)L - pcI - K]
and the bank’s problem becomes
[A7] Max   dtKIpLwOPDrrLnyLrrte cCcLccDccnL    )1()1()1()1()*()1(*)(0
64 See, for example, Freixas and Rochet (1997).




This problem can be solved by first choosing the amount of inputs, given an amount of
outputs, that minimize costs and then by choosing the level of output in order to
maximize profits.
The cost minimization problem is:
[A9] Min   dtKIpLwte CcCcL    )1()1(0
under the equations of motion [A8].
The resolution of this problem gives the conditional input demand function for inputs
and, correspondingly, the cost of producing a given amount of output (loan, deposit or
other product), expressed as a function of METR on inputs.
[A10] Ci= C [i, w(1+L), pc (ρ+δ) (1+k)] with i = Ln, D, OP
The bank’s present value maximization problem is












Therefore, the current –value Hamiltonian is
[A13] H = [(rL-r*)Ln(1-c)+cγζ Ln + (r*-rD)D(1-c)+f NO(1-tc)-CLn-CD-COP] + λ (l-ζLn) + μ d

























where MCLn and MCD refer to the marginal cost of intermediating an additional unit of
loan and deposit, and TL and D the corresponding METR.
Appendix 2:  METRs on inputs
METR on labour
The marginal effective tax rate on labour incorporates social contributions and, if
necessary, other taxes on value added, as IRAP in the Italian case. Social contribution rates
are differentiated with category of worker and, in order to calculate a representative
measure, could be necessary to refer to a “typical” worker. In general term the before tax
rate of return of labour is
[A16] rn=w
Then, adding social contributions, we have
[A17] rg=w(1+L)







rrt   )1(
METR on capital
Tangible capital
In the traditional analysis of investment, the fundamental concept for quantifying the
effects of tax is the user cost of capital, a concept introduced by Jorgenson (1963) and
developed by several authors. This concept is based on the equivalence between renting
and owning a piece of durable capital. In its simplest form, the user cost of capital (rnk) is
the financial cost of capital or the opportunity cost of funds, as measured by the weighted
average ( is the debt asset ratio) of the nominal interest rate (r) and opportunity cost of
equity (ρ) less the expected rate of inflation ().
[A19] rnk= r +(1-)ρ-
The definition of rnk needs to be broadened to incorporate economic depreciation, relative
prices, and taxes. In the standard user cost formula, capital is assumed to depreciate
geometrically at rate δ. As with any microeconomic price variable, the user cost must be
defined as a relative price. The numerator is the price of new investment goods (q), and the
denominator depends on an additional assumption about the benefit to the firm from the
new unit of capital. For a profit-maximizing firm, the relevant benefit is the incremental
output, and the price of output appears in the denominator.
A variety of taxes can be reflected in the user cost formula: the purchase price is deducted
as a business expense gradually over the life of the asset. The present value of this stream
of current and future tax depreciation deductions () is multiplied by the rate of income
65 The expression for rg results from the usual maximization condition. If the net of taxes marginal
productivity of labour is equivalent to the marginal cost w(1+L), which is deductible for corporation tax
purposes,  we obtain: MPL(1-c)=w(1+L)(1-c) and MPL = rg = w(1+L)
taxation (c), and the combined expression enters the user cost formula as an adjustment to
the purchase price. Income taxes also enter the model by lowering the price of output in
the denominator and perhaps the financial cost of capital if nominal interest payments are
tax deductible. Lastly, investment tax credits (k) on the purchase of new capital goods can
be considered; these credits are reductions in tax liabilities determined as a percentage of
the price of a purchased asset.
More in details, the user cost of capital ucc can be written as
[A20] ucc = (r f+ δ - ) q (1 k - c ) / (1 - c) - δ
with r f=  r (1 - c)+(1-) ρ
where  is, again, the share of debt in total assets. Normalizing the price of capital goods
and considering the net-of-depreciation marginal productivity (that under the
maximization assumption is equal to the user cost), we have
[A21] rgk = (r f+ δ - ) (1 – k - c ) / (1 - c) - δ
that is the gross of tax rate and net-of-depreciation rate of return of marginal unit of
capital.
As previously discussed, the share of debt capital can be considered zero in the case of a
financial firm where risk capital is adequate for purchasing tangible assets (i.e. =0). At
the same time, financial services are exempt from VAT and, as a consequence, banks
cannot deduct from their VAT liability the amount of tax they paid on purchases of capital
goods as NFFs do.
[A22] rgk = [1+vat (1-PR)] (ρ+δ-) (1-k-c) / (1- c) - δ
where vat is the VAT rate and PR is the pro-rata coefficient66.
In case of buildings, however, there isn’t any VAT to be computed.
Intangible capital
In order to calculate METRs on research and development activity, which can result in
intangible assets or human capital accumulation, labour inputs and capital inputs, must be
split up. Differences from previous expression may arise with regard to specific tax credits
and amortization period embedded in tax legislation.





66 As the output of a financial firm consists of both exempt and taxable supplies of services, where
only the taxable operations qualifies for VAT deductions, the problem of apportioning the taxes
paid on purchased inputs between taxable and exempt output arises. The Pro-Rata rule is a method
for dealing with this problem. Deductible input taxes can be obtained by applying the ratio between
taxable output and total output to the total input tax paid.
